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Abstract
Simulation experiments are conducted on simple continuous
double auction (CDA) markets based on the experimental
economicsworkofVernonSmith. CDAmodelswithinexper-
imental economics usually consist of a sequence of discrete
trading periods or “days”, with allocations of stock and cur-
rency replenished at the start of each day, a situation we call
“periodic” replenishment. In our experiments we look at both
periodic and continuous-replenishment versions of the CDA.
In this we build on the work of Cliff and Preist (2001) with
human subjects, but we replace human traders with Zero In-
telligence Plus (ZIP) trading agents, a minimal algorithm that
can produce equilibrating market behaviour in CDA mod-
els. Our results indicate that continuous-replenishment (CR)
CDA markets are similar to conventional periodic CDA mar-
kets in their ability to show equilibration dynamics. Secondly
we show that although both models produce the same be-
haviour of price formation, they are different playing ﬁelds,
as periodic markets are more efﬁcient over time than their
continuous counterparts. We also ﬁnd, however, that the vol-
ume of trade in periodic CDA markets is concentrated in the
early period of each trading day, and the market is in this
sense inefﬁcient. We look at whether ZIP agents require dif-
ferent parameters for optimal behaviour in each market type,
and ﬁnd that this is indeed the case. Overall, our conclusions
mirror earlier ﬁndings on the robustness of the CDA, but we
stress that a CR-CDA marketplace equilibrates in a different
way to a periodic one.
Introduction
The Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is a market insti-
tution that plays a fundamental role in the world economy.
It is the principal trading format for commodity markets,
equity exchanges, foreign exchange, and derivatives mar-
kets. Real-world examples of CDA-based markets include
the NYSE and the Chicago mercantile exchange. Although
we have a great deal of observational data on these markets,
it would be both difﬁcult and illegal to manipulate them ex-
perimentally. Our understanding of how CDAs work has
therefore been greatly enriched ﬁrst by the discipline of ex-
perimental economics (Smith, 1962), in which human sub-
jects participate in economic games in the laboratory. More
recently CDAs have been studied using the methods of ar-
tiﬁcial life: in agent-based computational economics (see
Tesfatsion, 2002, for a review) the behaviour of a simu-
lated market emerges from the interactions of many rela-
tively simple trading agents.
Our particular interest is in how the temporal structure
of a CDA can affect both overall market performance and
the optimal strategies for agents participating in that market.
We look at two variant CDAs: one is an explicitly periodic
market in which there is a discrete trading period with daily
opening and closing points; we refer to this as the day-based
or periodic-replenishment (PR) market. The second variant
involves a non-periodic or continuous-replenishment (CR)
market which allows for trading without interruption. We
refer to the continuous-replenishment variant of the CDA as
the CR market. These two types of CDA have important
real-world exemplars: most stock exchanges are day-based,
for instance, whereas the global foreign exchange markets
are continuous-time. Intuition suggests that these markets
are signiﬁcantly different playing ﬁelds. Our goal is to use
an agent-based model to ﬁnd out how different these two
CDA variants really are.
Experimental economics
The motivation of experimental economics is to model eco-
nomic phenomena using human participants in controlled
laboratory situations. Smith (1962) conducted pioneering
studies in which a small number of inexperienced human
traders participated in a CDA and were able to reach a
competitive equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity of a
traded commodity. Smith derived a qualitative indication of
the relationship of supply and demand curves in producing
equilibrating transaction prices and presented results sug-
gesting the replication of classical microeconomic theory,
all from a surprisingly simple model.
Smith’s studies are recognized as the standard modelling
framework for CDAs and the simplicity of Smith’s con-
cept has been integral to its success. Recent research has
focused on establishing the robustness of Smith’s general
ﬁndings and examining the ﬁdelity with which these exper-
iments reproduce phenomena from real CDA markets. The
reproducibility of economic phenomena is important as it
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latory agency setting up a new marketplace) can use these
experiments to develop fairer and more robust market mech-
anisms. On the other hand, traders (and the operators or
regulators of ﬁnancial institutions) can use results from ex-
perimentaleconomicstoidentifyandexploitstrategicniches
in their existing marketplaces.
Computational economics
If we take the human traders of the experimental economics
paradigm and replace them with programs representing dif-
ferent trading strategies, we get agent-based computational
economics (ACE) (Gode and Sunder, 1993; Cliff, 1997; Tes-
fatsion, 2002). An important aspect of this research has been
ﬁnding the simplest algorithm capable of producing equili-
brating market dynamics in a similar fashion to human par-
ticipants. Cliff (1997) introduced the Zero-Intelligence Plus
trading agent (ZIP) as an algorithm with minimal intelli-
gence that nevertheless produced market behaviour that was
very close to that of human traders. ZIP trading agents are
a modiﬁed version of an earlier agent known as ZI (Zero In-
telligence), created by Gode and Sunder (1993). ZI traders
are simply stochastic agents that announce random prices
for bids and offers. ZIP is able to model CDA price forma-
tion based on an intuitive heuristic “decision tree” algorithm
coupledwithelementarymachinelearningtechniques(Cliff,
1997).
Computationally lightweight autonomously adaptive
(“intelligent”) trading agents (such as ZIP) are extremely
signiﬁcant given the emergence of virtual market-places. On
the side of the market designer, iterative economic simula-
tionsusingZIPallowexperimentstobeconductedfasterand
yield signiﬁcant results insofar as the ZIP trader can be seen
as a realistic model. On the side of ﬁnancial institutions that
act within the market there is an incentive to replace human
traders with automated trading agents. A fair chunk of work
inACEmodellingtodateconcernstheuseofagentsinspired
by the ZIP architecture in CDA markets. Studies have con-
centrated on evolving more robust agents and trading strate-
gies. A basic ZIP agent acting in a periodic-replenishment
(PR) CDA market with ﬁxed supply and demand curves (as
in the classic Smith experiment) has been used by a num-
ber of authors as the de facto benchmark for demonstrating
equilibrating price formation with artiﬁcial agents.
The impact of replenishment in markets
Past work using intelligent agents in CDA markets has
rarely explored the importance of the replenishment sched-
ule within the market model. Round-the-clock 365-days-
per-year environments are emerging at a fast rate in the
real world, and yet continuous-replenishment modelas are
perhaps one of the least discussed CDA variants (Cliff
and Preist, 2001) in experimental economics. The stan-
dard Smith CDA model is conducted over discrete intervals
known as trading days, and the dynamics of the market are
centered around this day-trading structure. As not all real
CDA markets are periodic the applicability of a day-based
model to these variants is dubious. In what we believe to
be the ﬁrst human-based experimental economics studies to
address this issue, Cliff and Preist (2001) explored the ef-
fect of removing periodicity from the standard CDA model
by allowing continuous trading — i.e., switched from PR
to CR CDA models. Cliff and Preist’s general conclusion
was that the ability of a CDA market to reach an equilibrium
price did not seem to be affected by the switch from PR to
CR. However, due to the inherent difﬁculties in human ex-
perimentation, the sample size in these experiments is really
rather small.
Experimental aim
Our goal is to look at whether PR and CR markets produce
different trading dynamics, and ultimately we would like to
examine optimal trading behaviour across a wide range of
different replenishment structures of the marketplace. In this
paper we directly extend the work of Cliff and Preist (2001)
by developing both continuous- and periodic-replenishment
markets with ZIP traders instead of humans. We are es-
pecially interested in potential differences between the two
market types that may have been too subtle to be detected
given Cliff and Preist’s limited sample size.
Method
We wrote computer simulations recreating the methods
of Cliff (1997) and Cliff and Preist (2001), which are
both adaptations of the experimental economics methods of
Smith and Williams (1983). The method is a static model of
a continuous double auction: i.e., supply and demand curves
are ﬁxed, and market participants (“traders”) each privately
know how many units they are willing to trade and the cost
or value of each of their units, but not the allocations of any
other traders.
There are 22 trader-agents in the simulated market: 11
buyers and 11 sellers. Each individual agent is allocated a
private ﬁxed limit price. The limit price speciﬁes, for sell-
ers, the minimum price at which they can sell, and for buy-
ers, the maximum price at which they can buy. The differ-
ence between an agent’s limit price and the actual transac-
tion price they may achieve for the commodity is their utility
— “proﬁt” for sellers, “savings” for buyers. Limit prices for
each of the agents are different, i.e., the agents vary in how
much the commodity is worth to them. Limit prices range
between $0.75 and $3.25 as shown in ﬁgure 1.
At the start of the experiment the 11 buyers and 11 sell-
ers enter the market, with the sellers each in possession of
one unit of the commodity, and the buyers each seeking to
purchase one unit. We refer to these units as the agents’ en-
titlements to buy or to sell. A single experiment — in the
standard, periodic-replenishment case — consists here of a
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D, for 11 buyers and 11 sellers. Vertical axis is price in
cents ($0.50 to $4.00); equilibrium price P0 = $2.00. Supply
and demand curves are ﬁxed and symmetrical for all experi-
ments. Figure is reproduced from Cliff (1997).
sequence of 20 trading periods, referred to as days. Each day
is separated into 120 trading intervals (referred to as ticks).
A tick is a discrete boundary of time at which a complete
trading interaction can be executed (i.e., up to 120 attempted
trades can take place during a day). Buyers and sellers nor-
mally have their entitlements reset to at the start of each
trading day, by replenishing money to buyers and stock to
sellers.
The arrangement of buyer and seller limit prices creates
a stepped supply and demand curve for the imaginary com-
modity with a theoretical equilibrium price (P0 = $2.00) and
theoretical equilibrium quantity (Q0 = 6) of units traded.
Economic theory suggests that for rational agents participat-
ing in such a market, trading dynamics will show the com-
petitiveequilibrationcolloquiallyknownas“thelawsofsup-
ply and demand”. In excess demand (trading taking place
below the equilibrium) there is an incentive for the buyers
to raise their bids to ensure they make a trade, and in excess
supply (trading taking place above equilibrium) there is an
incentive for sellers to lower offers to ensure a successful
trade with a buyer (Cliff, 1997).
Trading process
With the market set up as described, buyers and sellers then
engage in a CDA, in which they are free to announce and
accept bids and offers for the commodity. The auction pro-
cedure is the same as that used by Cliff (1997).
1. At each tick a randomly selected agent quotes a price. This will
be a bid if the agent is a buyer or an offer if the agent is a seller.
The quoted price is made public to all agents from both com-
munities and is the future transaction price for the trade. The
agent’s choice of price to quote is a function of its strategy.
2. Agents of the “contraside” (i.e., buyers responding to an offer,
or sellers responding to a bid) make an assessment on whether
dealing at the quoted price would be proﬁtable for them. Again,
this decision is a function of the agent’s strategy. For ZIP agents,
the decision will be inﬂuenced by their limit price but also by
their current estimated valuation which is based on the recent
history of successful trades in the marketplace.
3. If no willing agents are present in the market, i.e., the quoted bid
is too low or the offer is too high, that tick-step is designated as
a failed trade, and the market progresses onto the next tick.
4. If an agent decides that the shouted price is acceptable, it desig-
nates itself as a willing agent.
5. Prices of willing agents are arranged into a queue similar to
NYSE rules (i.e., a trader makes a bid or offer at any time, but
once made it is persistent until the trader alters it for a better
price or it is accepted).
6. An agent is chosen from the queue, and the quoted price is the
transaction price for the trade. The entitlements of both agents
decrease by one and the proﬁt and bank balances of the agents
are adjusted according to the transaction price.
7. Finally, agents are assessed on their market activity state.
Agents with no remaining entitlements to trade drop out of the
market (although entitlements may later be reset, e.g., at the be-
ginning of the next trading day).
A day’s trading can be terminated prematurely if there are
no active agents remaining in the market. Otherwise the
market is open for 120 ticks, the duration designated for a
trading day. For our markets we arbitrarily set the number
of trading days to 20, to measure market performance over a
reasonable period of time.
The periodic CDA
The replenishment schedule in a CDA market model effec-
tively determines how and when the buying and selling en-
titlements of traders are reset. The periodic-replenishment
(PR) variant is the default condition that has been described
above; this is a replication of the Smith and Williams (1983)
and Cliff (1997) models. The PR market forces the simulta-
neous and uniform renewal of all trading entitlements at the
start of each day.
The continuous-replenishment CDA
Forthecontinuous-replenishment(CR)CDAwerecreatethe
market model of Cliff and Preist (2001) where there is no
division of time into trading days. Once opened, the mar-
ket continues for 2400 ticks until the end of the experiment.
Every 120 ticks (the equivalent time frame for a day in peri-
odic market) the entitlements for each agent are updated in-
dependently and with staggered phases. In short, the market
is always open, and although agents temporarily drop out of
trading after successfully buying or selling their single unit,
they will return to trading at a randomly determined point in
the future.
We have implemented two variations of the staggered
renewal of agent entitlements, one referred to as peri-
odic continuity or continuous(P) and the second referred to
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markets, at every 10th tick a chosen buyer and seller update
by receiving a single unit entitlement to buy or sell. Within
a 120-tick period the continuous(P) market is injected with
the same number of entitlements as a periodic market would
be. We retain the method of paired renewal (i.e., one buyer
and one seller receiving entitlements at the same time) from
the Cliff and Preist (2001) experiments in order to ensure
that trading should always be possible in principle.
In continuous(S) markets the renewal of entitlements for
a pair of agents can take place at any randomly determined
point in the 120-tick pseudo-day period. As an example, in
the continuous(S) model it would be possible (if unlikely)
for all agents to renew their entitlements within the ﬁrst 11
ticks of a given market period. Although the difference be-
tween the two continuous models is subtle, we consider the
continuous(P)renewalmethodtoretainaformofperiodicity
with the regularity between update times, whereas the con-
tinuous(S) renewal times make the market replenishments
totally asynchronous.
Results
We summarize experimental results on the performance of
ZIP trading agents in PR and CR CDAs. We focus on ﬁve
hypotheses which complement and extend earlier work by
Cliff and Preist (2001). In the results presented here we use
agents with parameters that are randomly assigned for each
experiment, therefore we generate mean results on the basis
of500independentexperimentalsimulationsforeachcondi-
tion. Each experiment was assigned an independent random
seed. The market setup for each experiment was consistent
(i.e., number of agents, symmetrical supply and demand,
maximum surplus of commodity that enters the market over
time) and our population of agents was always re-initialised
for each experiment. The experiments reported from Hy-
pothesis 2 onwards are, as far as we know, the ﬁrst to look at
the performance of ZIP trading agents in CR CDAs. Our
ﬁrst step is therefore to validate our results by compari-
son with previous documentation of ZIP trader performance
(Cliff and Bruten, 1998).
Hypothesis 1: The replication of the static formula-
tion model recreates equilibrating market dynamics with
minimal-intelligence agents. Our replication of the pe-
riodic market model of Cliff and Bruten (1998) shows al-
most identical qualitative results with the earlier work. The
equilibration dynamics at the theoretical equilibrium price
(P0=$2.00)andtheequilibriumquantity(Q0), thebehaviour
of transaction prices, the upper and lower bounds of trans-
action price, and the decline and convergence of Smith’s α
coefﬁcient, are all in agreement with previous ﬁndings. Our
replication of results for the periodic model thus gives us
conﬁdence that our additional results are valid.
Hypothesis 2: Continuous-replenishment CDA markets
produce equilibrating price formation with intelligent
agents. Figure 2 demonstrates that both PR and CR CDAs
show equilibrating behaviour. Figure 2 compares the mean
transaction price over time for the PR CDA on the left, and
the CR CDA with stochastic renewal on the right. The re-
sults for the CR CDA with periodic renewal (not shown)
were extremely similar to the stochastic renewal ﬁndings.
The upper and lower bounds of the graphs show bound-
aries for the average highest and lowest transaction prices.
There is signiﬁcant agreement across all market models for
market equilibration at the competitive equilibrium price P0
($2.00). However, careful inspection of ﬁgure 2 shows that
the upper and lower bounds on average transaction prices
over each day vary between each market model. PR markets
converge at a relatively slower rate in the early phases of the
experiment (Day 1-3), however the transition to price forma-
tion at P0 is dynamically more stable. CR markets demon-
strate a wider range of transaction prices at start-up and have
relatively erratic price-forming dynamics in the early phases
of the experiment compared to PR markets. After approxi-
mately 10 days both market types are stable around the com-
petitive equilibrium price.
Smith and Williams (1983) illustrate the deviation of
transaction prices from P0 using the metric α0, based on
the root mean squared (RMS) difference between the equi-
librium and transaction price during each trading period.
If there are np transactions in a trading period α0(p) = q
1
npΣ(pi − P0)2, where P0 is the theoretical equilibrium
price. For our CR markets we need to make a distinction
similar to Cliff and Preist (2001) and treat transactions oc-
curing within a 120-tick time window as constituting a day’s
worth of transactions to allow comparison with the periodic
market over time. The results are shown in ﬁgure 3.
Initial market transience is associated with high values of
α, which is another way of saying that in the ﬁrst few days
of the experiment transactions occur at prices far from the
equilibrium P0. (Indeed, on the ﬁrst day of the experiment
values of α are off the scale for ﬁgure 3 at 20 or higher.) CR
markets at ﬁrst appear to have the advantage: in comparison
to PR markets they are generally closer to P0 during initial
market transience and converge at a faster rate towards P0.
The difference in α between periodic and continuous mar-
kets over days 1–7 is approximately 44% in favour of con-
tinuous markets. However, during later stages of the exper-
iments (days 7–20) periodic markets converge more closely
on the equilibrium price to become consistently 24% more
efﬁcient than continuous markets.
Both variants of the CR CDA seem to plateau with a mean
α value of 1.8–2.0, whereas, the α value for the periodic
market may still be declining at the 20-day mark. In a sense
the CR markets have achieved stability, i.e., a stable α-value,
but of course this represents a consistent tendency for trades
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Figure 4: Mean convergence statistics for late-phase mar-
kets (days 11–20) with 500 ZIP experiments for each mar-
ket model. Results for α indicate that the PR CDA is the
most efﬁcient, followed by the CR CDA with periodic re-
newal, and then the CR CDA with stochastic renewal. Av-
erage proﬁt dispersion is roughly equal for all three types of
replenishment.
are at a mean of 1.72 (σ = 0.047). Morning trade activ-
ity in periodic markets is very close to the equilibrium price
despite the higher volume of trading. Approximately 79%
of all experimental transaction occurs in the morning for a
periodic market model, whereas in continuous markets the
“morning” period has no particular signiﬁcance and so ob-
viously it accounts for 25% of trading.
Hypothesis 5: The optimal parameters for trading
agents will take on different values depending on the
market type. The behaviour of ZIP agents depends on a
number of different parameters. Several different variables
dictate the speed with which a ZIP trader modiﬁes its price
in the market, but the two most important are the Widrow-
Hoff momentum (γ) and the agent learning rate (β). Preist
(1999) demonstrates the signiﬁcance of these variables. We
looked at the effectiveness of different γ and β values in
both periodic and continuous markets by creating surface
plots of market efﬁciency, measured by Smith’s α, for ho-
mogeneous communities of ZIP agents: see ﬁgure 5. We
ﬁnd that the resulting proﬁles of market efﬁciency are dif-
ferent for periodic and continuous CDAs. In other words, if
I am a ZIP agent, the optimal settings for my core parameter
values will depend on the market type I am in. In a periodic
market, a value of β = 0.2 will produce the most efﬁcient
equilibratingmarketperformance. Momentumγ, whichacts
to damp the oscillations for heuristic adjustments, can then
vary across the range of 0.1–0.5 and this makes little differ-
ence to performance if β = 0.2 (see ﬁgure 5, left panel).
In continuous-replenishment markets, the best example of
market equilibration results from ZIP traders with β = 0.1.
Continuous markets react more than periodic markets when
γ is varied over the range 0.1–0.5. In a continuous market
ZIP agents with lower momentum result in more efﬁcient
market behaviour (ﬁgure 5, right panel).
Intuitively we might expect that fast learning (a high value
of β) and strong damping of adjustment oscillations (a high
value of γ) would produce ZIP agents with more efﬁcient
market behaviour. Instead the trend for both markets is the
opposite. Of course, we should be aware that ZIP parame-
ters are not limited to γ and β. Our rationale for using these
variables was not to ﬁnd the most efﬁcient ZIP trading strat-
egy, but merely to illustrate that market replenishment style
affects the way a ZIP trader should best operate.
It is also noteable from these results that some of our com-
binations of ﬁxed γ and β ZIP variables produce markets
that are almost 50% more efﬁcient than those of the pop-
ulations of ZIP agents used in the main set of experiments
that featured the random assignment of parameters. This ev-
idence is suggestive that there may be a market efﬁciency
gain if all traders are uniform agents and consequently can
be said to share the same idea of rational behaviour.
Discussion
Our experiments are, as far as we know, the ﬁrst studies
conducted with adaptive artiﬁcial trading agents operating
in a simulation of a continuous-replenishment CDA. We
have demonstrated the robustness of the CDA institution in
fair price formation, by showing that groups of ZIP trading
agents can consistently converge to the competitive equilib-
rium price and quantity governed by the supply and demand
curves of the market. These results validate the observation
of Cliff and Preist (2001) that both periodic and continuous
markets can reach an equilibrium price. The use of simula-
tion methods allows us to examine price formation variables
more easily than in human-based experiments and we have
therefore compared and contrasted the two CDA variants in
more detail than was possible for Cliff & Preist in 1998.
Firstly, we found that proﬁt dispersion between markets is
almost identical in the later phase of the market for all three
of our CDA variants. Secondly, we examined the α statistic
over time, which calculates the divergence of market activ-
ity from the competitive equilibrium price. A comparison
between the α values of periodic and continuous markets
over time suggests that periodic markets equilibrate more ef-
ﬁciently over the long run than do continuous-replenishment
markets. Comparing markets in late-phase allows measure-
ments that are free from the effects of initial market turbu-
lence, and thus facilitates a fair comparison between peri-
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Figure 5: Surface plot of α against different values for γ (momentum) and β (learning rate) in a homogeneous ZIP agent
community. The periodic market is shown on the left and the continuous market on the right. Results were generated over 500
experiments with all other agent parameters remaining at default values for ZIP version 1 (Cliff and Bruten, 1998). Note that
the two surfaces are quite different, indicating that the two market types produce different optimal strategies.
odic and continuous markets. With no difference in proﬁt
dispersion across the three market types but with periodic
markets achieving the most impressive (i.e., lowest) α val-
ues, this suggests that periodic markets represent a (near)
Pareto-optimal solution to the problem of market design,
with respect to our two measures of market efﬁciency.
Our original intuitions about the likely relationship be-
tween market efﬁciency and temporal structure were, in fact,
the direct opposite of our results. We expected that the re-
occuring event of an opening and closing of the market for
our periodic variant would be enough to bring about a mini-
ﬂuctuation in the movement of opening prices each day and
that possibly this pattern of trading would lead to oscilla-
tions around the equilibrium price at daily intervals. For CR
markets, our intuition was that competitive price formation
would occur early on and be maintained without such inter-
ruptions. Our original expectations can be summed up by
the analogy that an engine that is continually restarted runs
less smoothly than one that only starts once.
While it is not immediately clear why periodic markets
overtimedeviatelessfromthecompetitiveequilibriumprice
when compared to continuous markets, we can illustrate one
reason for this behaviour from the perspective of the propor-
tion of active agents within the market. The aggregate move-
ment of price formation towards transactions at the equilib-
riumpriceonlyoccursifanagentisactivewithinthemarket.
For PR markets there is no potential delay in an agent being
active for any given day, as by default all agents are deemed
active at the start of each day. In a CR market, agents may
in theory wait for a maximum time period equivalent to two
days before being active within the market. An agent can
only make meaningful contributions to the movement of the
current trading price when it is active. Therefore in periodic
markets, in which all agents start the day as active partic-
ipants in the market, the collective action of all agents in
reaching the equilibrium price will be maximally efﬁcient.
It may be that this activity being concentrated in time leads
to the improved α values of the periodic market in compari-
son to the continuous ones.
Our average α-values for both the CR and PR variants
of the market compare poorly to the reported α-values ob-
tained by Cliff and Preist (2001) with human traders. This
may well indicate relative inefﬁciency on the part of our ZIP
agents, but it is also possible that the α-values reported by
Cliff and Preist were the result of a regrettably small sample
size.
The majority of PR market transactions occur within the
“morning” period (i.e., the ﬁrst 25% of the trading day),
whereas in CR markets the trading activity is unsurprisingly
spread across the trading day as the morning has no special
signiﬁcance. After the rush of morning trading, the remain-
der of the day in a periodic market is an empty trading envi-
ronment, although quotes are still continuously made. In a
sense, our PR markets “waste” most of the time of their par-
ticipant traders, as (in these experiments) there isn’t enough
marketsurplustofulﬁllthedesiredshouts; andsoonaverage
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ciently — used over the duration of each day. In contrast,
the CR market successfully facilitates continuous trading.
Many of these dynamics may be attributable to the assump-
tion that each trader makes only one trade per day. How-
ever, even if agents traded many units per day we believe
that a concentration of trading volume in the morning would
remain characteristic of periodic markets as opposed to con-
tinuous. Empirically testing this belief remains a topic for
further work.
How does periodicity of replenishment affect the agent?
Our results suggest that groups of agents with uniform trad-
ing heuristics perform differently in each market. Therefore,
each market requires a different trading strategy to produce
the greatest efﬁciency or to extract the greatest utility. From
the agent perspective, these two styles of market replenish-
ment create two different playing ﬁelds. Results show that
each market is capable of reaching the equilibrium price
with intelligent trading agents, but it is important to empha-
size that the greatest market efﬁciency is achieved by differ-
ent agent strategies in the different marketplaces.
Questions concerning which of PR or CR as a market
model is more efﬁcient and which model offers the fairest
proﬁt distribution are hard to clarify. Indeed, if these ques-
tions were easy to answer, we assume that all real-world
CDA markets would have converged to the optimal market
model. The distinction between market types exists because
each possesses different practical features in their own right.
Further work
While the results presented in this report illustrate new work
on the CR market model, there are still many ways in which
our experiments could be extended. Firstly, we limited our
ZIP agents to handling only a single trade per day. Cliff
and Preist worked with traders with multiple entitlements
per day, who were also able to buy or sell multiple units in
one transaction. The rationale for allowing our ZIP traders
multipledailyentitlementswouldbetolookatwhethermore
sophisticated trading takes place, based on accumulated en-
titlements being ﬁlled at a later time in a continuous market.
We have kept our models of agents and markets simple
in the interests of clarity. However, there are numerous fea-
tures of the trading agent behaviour that could be improved.
ZIP agents are unable to formulate a decision process that
considers waiting in the market and making full use of con-
tinuous time (i.e., they cannot make a decision as to whether
waiting is better than buying now). The ZIP agents used
here are the original 1997-vintage “Version 1.0”, now re-
ferred to as ZIP08 (Cliff, 2008). One consideration would
to implement an optimising ZIP60 agent (Cliff, 2008) based
on a genetic algorithm, to properly observe how different the
optimised variables would be in each market. This would be
a full extension of Hypothesis 5. Additionally a ZIP agent
could also be made sensitive to CR markets by receiving
more informative signals on how long the market has been
running, and through greater temporal awareness being able
to exploit strategies such as delaying the sale of a commod-
ity in order to exploit a shortage and higher prices later on.
We could also be more rigorous in creating a framework
that is completely free from synchronous behaviour. This
is obviously desirable because of the asynchronous nature
of real markets. The rate at which our agents update their
price information is synchronised in our models, at each
tick. It is possible that experimenting with an asynchronous
and varied update rate for each agent could capture the asyn-
chronous intelligence of real-world populations of traders.
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